What was the ruling on this Supreme Court case Edgewood vs Kirby 1993 and what were the results of this ruling?

In 1968, Demetrio Rodriguez and other parents of Mexican American students in the Edgewood Independent School District of San Antonio, Texas, filed a class action suit in U.S. District Court challenging Texas’ public school finance system. Under the Texas system, the state appropriated funds to provide each child with a minimum education. Each local school district then enriched that basic education with funds derived from locally levied ad valorem property taxes. Since the value of taxable property and the number of school-aged children varied greatly among the state’s many school districts, significant interdistrict disparities existed in available enrichment revenues, per-pupil expenditures, and tax rates.

The plaintiffs argued that this led to better education for students in wealthier school districts and worse education for students in poorer districts and was thus a violation of the equal protection of the law of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. A three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court unanimously ruled that education was a fundamental constitutional right and that wealth-based classifications such as Texas had created were constitutionally suspect. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez by a 5-4 vote reversed the lower court’s decision and thus sustained Texas’ public school finance system. The majority held that education is not a fundamental right since it is neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.

In the decade after Rodriguez, Texas enacted a series of “equalization” reforms but failed to reduce significantly the interdistrict inequities in access to resources, per-pupil expenditures, and tax rates. With recourse to the U.S. Constitution and federal courts foreclosed by virtue of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez, the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) on behalf of the Edgewood Independent School District, other school districts, Rodriguez, and other parents of Mexican American students filed suit in a Texas District Court against Texas Commissioner of Education William Kirby and others. They argued that the state’s public school finance system violated the Texas Constitution. In 1987, the District Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs by finding Texas’ public school finance system unconstitutional. The District Court ordered the Texas Legislature to formulate a more equitable system by 1989. The state appealed this decision to a three-judge panel of Texas’ Third Court of Appeals, which reversed the District Court’s judgment on grounds that education was not a basic right and furthermore ruled that Texas’ system of public school finance was constitutional. The Edgewood Independent School District and the other plaintiffs appealed to the Texas Supreme Court.

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777 S.W.2d 391 58 USLW 2223, 56 Ed. Law Rep. 663 EDGEWOOD INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Petitioners, v.
William KIRBY et al., Respondents.

No. C-8353. Supreme Court of Texas. Oct. 2, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1989.

Albert H. Kauffman, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, San Antonio, David Hall, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Inc., Weslaco, Roger Rice, Camilo Perez, Peter Roos, Meta, Inc., Somerville, Mass., Richard E. Gray, III, Gray & Becker, David R. Richards, Richards, Wiseman & Durst, Austin, for petitioners.

Earl Luna, Robert E. Luna, Dallas, James W. Deatherage, Power, Deatherage, Tharp & Blankenship, Irving, Kevin T. O'Hanlon, Office of the Atty. Gen. of Texas, Jim Mattox, Atty. Gen., Timothy L. Hall, Hughes & Luce, Austin, Jerry Hoodenpyle, Rohne, Hoodenpyle, Lobert & Myers, Arlington, for respondents.

OPINION

MAUZY, Justice.

At issue is the constitutionality of the Texas system for financing the education of public school children. Edgewood Independent

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School District, sixty-seven other school districts, and numerous individual school children and parents filed suit seeking a declaration that the Texas school financing system violates the Texas Constitution. The trial court rendered judgment to that effect and declared that the system violates the Texas Constitution, article I, section 3, article I, section 19, and article VII, section 1. By a 2-1 vote, the court of appeals reversed that judgment and declared the system constitutional. 761 S.W.2d 859 (1988). We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, with modification, affirm that of the trial court.

The basic facts of this cause are not in dispute. 1 The only question is whether those facts describe a public school financing system that meets the requirements of the Constitution. As summarized and excerpted, the facts are as follows.

There are approximately three million public school children in Texas. The legislature finances the education of these children through a combination of revenues supplied by the state itself and revenues supplied by local school districts which are governmental subdivisions of the state. Of total education costs, the state provides about forty-two percent, school districts provide about fifty percent, and the remainder comes from various other sources including federal funds. School districts derive revenues from local ad valorem property taxes, and the state raises funds from a variety of sources including the sales tax and various severance and excise taxes.

There are glaring disparities in the abilities of the various school districts to raise revenues from property taxes because taxable property wealth varies greatly from district to district. The wealthiest district has over $14,000,000 of property wealth per student, while the poorest has approximately $20,000; this disparity reflects a 700 to 1 ratio. The 300,000 students in the lowest-wealth schools have less than 3% of the state's property wealth to support their education while the 300,000 students in the highest-wealth schools have over 25% of the state's property wealth; thus the 300,000 students in the wealthiest districts have more than eight times the property value to support their education as the 300,000 students in the poorest districts. The average property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is more than twenty times greater than the average property wealth in the 100 poorest districts. Edgewood I.S.D. has $38,854 in property wealth per student; Alamo Heights I.S.D., in the same county, has $570,109 in property wealth per student.

The state has tried for many years to lessen the disparities through various efforts to supplement the poorer districts. Through the Foundation School Program, the state currently attempts to ensure that each district has sufficient funds to provide its students with at least a basic education. See Tex.Educ.Code § 16.002. Under this program, state aid is distributed to the various districts according to a complex formula such that property-poor districts receive more state aid than do property-rich districts. However, the Foundation School Program does not cover even the cost of meeting the state-mandated minimum requirements. Most importantly, there are no Foundation School Program allotments for school facilities or for debt service. The basic allotment and the transportation allotment understate actual costs, and the career ladder salary supplement for teachers is underfunded. For these reasons and more, almost all school districts spend additional local funds. Low-wealth districts use a significantly greater proportion of their local funds to pay the debt service on construction bonds while high-wealth districts are able to use their funds to pay for a wide array of enrichment programs.

Because of the disparities in district property wealth, spending per student varies widely, ranging from $2,112 to $19,333. Under the existing system, an average of $2,000 more per year is spent on each of the 150,000 students in the wealthiest districts

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than is spent on the 150,000 students in the poorest districts.

The lower expenditures in the property-poor districts are not the result of lack of tax effort. Generally, the property-rich districts can tax low and spend high while the property-poor districts must tax high merely to spend low. In 1985-86, local tax rates ranged from $.09 to $1.55 per $100 valuation. The 100 poorest districts had an average tax rate of 74.5 cents and spent an average of $2,978 per student. The 100 wealthiest districts had an average tax rate of 47 cents and spent an average of $7,233 per student. In Dallas County, Highland Park I.S.D. taxed at 35.16 cents and spent $4,836 per student while Wilmer-Hutchins I.S.D. taxed at $1.05 and spent $3,513 per student. In Harris County, Deer Park I.S.D. taxed at 64.37 cents and spent $4,846 per student while its neighbor North Forest I.S.D. taxed at $1.05 and yet spent only $3,182 per student. A person owning an $80,000 home with no homestead exemption would pay $1,206 in taxes in the east Texas low-wealth district of Leveretts Chapel, but would pay only $59 in the west Texas high-wealth district of Iraan-Sheffield. Many districts have become tax havens. The existing funding system permits "budget balanced districts" which, at minimal tax rates, can still spend above the statewide average; if forced to tax at just average tax rates, these districts would generate additional revenues of more than $200,000,000 annually for public education.

Property-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which there is no opportunity to free themselves. Because of their inadequate tax base, they must tax at significantly higher rates in order to meet minimum requirements for accreditation; yet their educational programs are typically inferior. The location of new industry and development is strongly influenced by tax rates and the quality of local schools. Thus, the property-poor districts with their high tax rates and inferior schools are unable to attract new industry or development and so have little opportunity to improve their tax base.

The amount of money spent on a student's education has a real and meaningful impact on the educational opportunity offered that student. High-wealth districts are able to provide for their students broader educational experiences including more extensive curricula, more up-to-date technological equipment, better libraries and library personnel, teacher aides, counseling services, lower student-teacher ratios, better facilities, parental involvement programs, and drop-out prevention programs. They are also better able to attract and retain experienced teachers and administrators.

The differences in the quality of educational programs offered are dramatic. For example, San Elizario I.S.D. offers no foreign language, no pre-kindergarten program, no chemistry, no physics, no calculus, and no college preparatory or honors program. It also offers virtually no extra-curricular activities such as band, debate, or football. At the time of trial, one-third of Texas school districts did not even meet the state-mandated standards for maximum class size. The great majority of these are low-wealth districts. In many instances, wealthy and poor districts are found contiguous to one another within the same county.

Based on these facts, the trial court concluded that the school financing system violates the Texas Constitution's equal rights guarantee of article I, section 3, the due course of law guarantee of article I, section 19, and the "efficiency" mandate of article VII, section 1. The court of appeals reversed. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and, with modification, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution provides:

A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools.

The court of appeals declined to address petitioners' challenge under this provision

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and concluded instead that its interpretation was a "political question." Said the court:

That provision does, of course, require that the school system be "efficient," but the provision provides no guidance as to how this or any other court may arrive at a determination of what is efficient or inefficient. Given the enormous complexity of a school system educating three million children, this Court concludes that which is, or is not, "efficient" is essentially a political question not suitable for judicial review.

761 S.W.2d at 867. We disagree. This is not an area in which the Constitution vests exclusive discretion in the legislature; rather the language of article VII, section 1 imposes on the...